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A new point in copyright law has recently come before the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Holmes v. Hunt (xg Sup. Ct. 6o6). In 1857-
58 Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes published a series of articles in the Atlantic
Monthly entitled "The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table." None of these ar-
ticles were copyrighted, but when the twelve serial numbers were completed,
they were bound into one volume and a copyright secured upon that. In i886,
twenty-eight years later, this copyright was renewed. The defendant in 1894
copied exactly the twelve serial numbers from the Atlantic Monthly, paged
them consecutively and bound them in one volume. An injunction against
this as an infringement was thereupon asked by the executor of Dr. Holmes,
but all the courts agreed in dismissing the bill. Mr. Justice Brown, in a very
clearopinion, indicates that the publication of "The Autocrat" in serialform
was a surrender of all the author's rights to the public. The statute of i831
provided that no one should be entitled to the benefits of copyright unless he
deposited a copy of the title before publication and a copy of the book within
three months after publication. This law wholly superseded the common law
right of an author to a monopoly. Dr. Holmes did not comply with the law.
There is no distinction between the publication of a book and the publication
of its contents. In case of copyright, the subject of property is the order of
the words,-not the words themselves, nor the ideas, nor the combination of
the various parts into a book. Such is the law as laid down by Justice Brown,
and nowhere is his logic open to attack. He notes the inconvenience that
may be caused to authors by compelling them to copyright their serial numbers
as they publish them, but. suggests that the law may be amended.
The extent of the power of the States to manage by legislation the affairs
of railroad companies, has come in a new form before the Supreme Court, in the
case of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern R. R. Co. v. Smith, decided
April 17, 1899. Under previous decisions of that court (L. S. &(S M. S. R. R.
Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285), the regulative powers of the legislatures have in
the main been upheld on the ground that the State was only exercising its
proper authority under the "police power," and that it did not thereby violate
the commerce clause of the Constitution by improper interference with inter-
state commerce. A limit to this power of the legislatures is marked by the
case just reported; yet how little it overstepped the line is shown by the fact
that the decision of the Supreme Court reversed that of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, and was itself dissented to by the Chief Justice, Justice Gray and
Justice McKenna.
The question presented was this-" has the legislature of a State, having
power to fix maximum rates an. charges for the transportation of persons and
property by railroad companies * and having power to alter,
amend, or repeal their charters within certain limitations * * * also
the right, after having fixed a minximum rate for the transportation of passen-
gers, to still further regulate t eir affairs and to discriminate aud make an
exception in favor of certain pe sons, and to give to them a right of transpor-
tation for a less sum than the general rate provided by law ?" In this case
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the discrimination was made by an amendment to the general railroad law
of Michigan, which provided for the sale of mileage tickets at a price below
that which the railroad, under its charter, had the right to demand. The
holders of mileage books thus constitute a privileged class whose formation is
an unjustifiable interference with the rights of the railroad company. "If"-
says Mr. Justice Peckham-"the maximum rates are too high, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, it may lower them, provided they do not make them
unreasonably low, as that term is understood in the law; but it cannot enact a
law making maximum rates and then proceed to make exceptions to it in favor
of such persons or classes as in the legislative judgment or caprice may seem
proper. * * * The power of the legislature to enact general laws
regarding a company and its affairs does not include the power to compel it
to make an exception in favor of some particular class in the community, and
to carrry the members of that class at a less sum than it has the right to
charge for those who are not fortunate enough to be members thereof." The
act of the legislature of Michigan was therefore held to be a violation of the
XIVth amendment and therefore unconstitutional.
A somewhat similar case (Attorney General v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 130
Mass. 62) held invalid a statute requiring every railroad corporation to have
on sale certain tickets which should be received for fare on all railroad lines in
the commonwealth. Here, too, the court refused to narrowly define the limits
of legislative control of railroad corporations. The question is undoubtedly
one of judicial discretion; but the tendency of the courts seems to be toward
more adequate protection for the railroads against arbitrary and unreasonable
legislation.
